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January

6

TO: S - The Secretary

THROUGH: S/S

FROM: FE - Dean Rusk

SUBJECT: Bi-partisan Policy on China-Formosa Problems

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR	
REVIEWED BY <u>June 9, 1950</u>	DATE <u>10 AUG 1981</u>
RDS ☐ or XDS ☐ EXT. DATE	TS AUTH. _____ REASON(S) _____
ENDORSE EXISTING MARKINGS ☐	DECLASSIFIED ☒ RELEASABLE ☒
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1. It is of vital importance to the national interest that we establish our policies toward the Far East on a broad bi-partisan basis as soon as possible. Bitter controversy within the United States greatly weakens us in the Far East by rendering our diplomacy less effective and by weakening the morale of the peoples of that area through doubt as to our real interest and intentions. My exploration of the problem thus far has led me to the conclusion that it should not be too difficult to maintain a bi-partisan approach toward Japan, Korea, the Ryukyus, the Philippines, and Southeast Asia. We have not yet achieved bi-partisanship toward the main elements of the China-Formosa problem.

2. It is believed that a basis exists for bi-partisan agreement on (a) Formosa, (b) the recognition of a government of China, and (c) the seating of a Chinese representative in the United Nations along the lines indicated in the Annex hereto. It is emphasized that these lines of action should be considered as a single package, the purpose of which is to get our attitude toward China and Formosa on a more realistic and workable basis.

3. It is recommended that the following steps be taken, in sequence, to expedite the necessary decisions by the U. S. Government:

(a) The Secretary discuss the broad line of action with the President and, if the President thinks well of the general approach, ask the President to request the comments of the Department of Defense (including the Joint Chiefs of Staff) as a matter of great urgency;

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Following the Secretary's talk with the President,

(b) Mr. Dulles be authorized to discuss the proposed line of action with Senator Vandenberg on a most confidential basis;

(c) Mr. Dulles and Mr. Rusk be authorized to discuss the proposed line of action with the Far East Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee;

(d) The Secretary and the President to discuss the proposed line of action with the "Big Four" of the Foreign Relations and Foreign Affairs Committees.

4. If and when the President authorizes us to proceed with the proposed line of action, it is recommended that:

(a) The matter be discussed with T. F. Tsiang, Chinese representative to the United Nations, and with the British and French Foreign Ministers;

(b) The United States place the question of Formosa before the Security Council of the United Nations;

(c) USUN discuss with selected UN delegations the procedures to set in motion consideration of the question of seating in the United Nations.

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ANNEX

I - FORMOSA

1. International interest

Formosa is a matter of legitimate and substantial international interest. Its final disposition has not been formally made by the governments responsible for a Japanese Peace Settlement. In addition, it is a problem which can properly be taken up by the United Nations inasmuch as it might lead to international friction, might give rise to a dispute, or might, if continued, endanger the maintenance of international peace and security. Further, to the extent that armed incidents between Formosa and the mainland continue and larger hostilities are imminent, the situation is one which might clearly constitute a threat to the peace within the meaning of Chapter VII of the Charter.

2. United States interest

The principal interests of the United States in the Formosa problem are:

(a) Our continuing interest as one of the principal powers involved in the Japanese Peace Settlement; since some of the war-time commitments of the Soviet Union on Far Eastern matters have not been fulfilled, the United States should reserve all of its rights pending a Japanese Peace Settlement;

(b) Our desire to avoid the forcible seizure of Formosa and its Chinese and Formosan inhabitants by Communist forces;

(c) Our desire to prevent the military exploitation of the island of Formosa by forces hostile to the United States and its allies;

(d) Our desire to see the issues concerning Formosa settled by peaceful means rather than by hostilities;

(e) United States interest and prestige are not concerned with the maintenance of any particular non-Communist regime on Formosa.

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
3. United Nations action

The United States should call the problem of Formosa to the attention of the Security Council and should ask that a United Nations Commission proceed to Formosa and report to the Security Council on the situation. The United States should accept membership on such a Commission. The Security Council should also call upon all governments and authorities concerned to cease hostile acts between Formosa and the mainland and refrain from any action likely to aggravate the situation.

It is anticipated that the United Nations Commission would, after several months, report back to the Security Council on the background of the Formosan issue and the attitudes of the various groups concerned, including the Formosans themselves. It is probable that such a Commission would, pending a peaceful settlement of the complex issues involved, recommend measures for holding the Formosa situation in status quo. The Commission might recommend some United Nations care-taking device such as a joint temporary trusteeship. If so, the United States should be willing to participate in a joint responsibility for the island. The longer the Formosa question remains in process of peaceful settlement the more likely it will be that its eventual disposition will be heavily influenced or decided by the principle of self-determination.

4. U. S. assistance to Formosa

U. S. assistance to Formosa should be increased to the extent permitted by the President's statement of January 5, 1950. If the Soviet Union vetoes the dispatch of a Commission by the Security Council, or if Communist forces on the mainland attempt to frustrate United Nations action by military action, or if Communist forces in China act aggressively against China's neighbors, the question of U. S. military assistance to Formosa should be promptly reviewed.



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II - RECOGNITION OF A GOVERNMENT OF CHINA

It is important that United States policy toward the recognition of a government in China support our political objectives in Asia but also be realistically based upon the factual situation. In the present confused situation in China, no clear-cut recognition of any government as the only government of "China" would be realistic, nor can it be predicted when the situation in China will be clarified. For the present, it is desirable to make available to the National Government of China the support and facilities which are involved in continuing diplomatic relations. The statement which follows indicates a way in which these several factors can be combined in an interim policy on recognition:

"I want to take this opportunity to review briefly the problem of diplomatic recognition in regard to China. The problem arose because of the Chinese Communists' continuing and progressive successes over a period of several years in the Chinese civil war. These culminated in the establishment last October at Peking of the Communist-styled "Central People's Government" of the "People's Republic of China". Since that time, the Chinese Communists have proceeded to extend their control southward and westward in China. As a consequence, the National Government evacuated to Formosa, which is now the only area where the regular authority of that Government extends.

"It would be a mistake, however, to conclude that the Peking regime exercises effective control in all of the territory of China apart from Formosa. Resistance to Communist authority continues in certain districts. Tibet remains under its former rulers. And very extensive and important regions of China -- including all of Manchuria, parts of Sinkiang and perhaps also of the Inner Mongolian provinces -- have for practical purposes been taken over by Soviet Russian imperialism. This last development carries with it most serious implications for the welfare of China and for international peace in that part of the world.

"In the months since the founding of the Peking regime, that regime has conducted its international relations in a way such as to suggest that its independence has been seriously

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interfered with by the Soviet Union through continuing pressure and attempts at domination. So far as United States interests in China are concerned, a number of instances have occurred of substantial departure from the recognized standards of conduct in international relations. American officials have been mistreated with official connivance, and in some instances directly by the local authorities. Consular properties of the United States have been seized in violation of treaty rights. Evacuation of American nationals desiring to leave China has been officially obstructed.

"While the United States continues to accord diplomatic recognition to the National Government of China, now located on Formosa, we are at the same time aware that the Chinese Communist regime at Peking exercises control over a large part of the territory of China. The United States looks to the Peking regime to discharge the obligations attaching to administration of the territory which that regime controls, just as our Government looks to the National Government of China on Formosa to discharge its international obligations."

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III - CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN THE UN

The problem of seating a Chinese representative in the UN should be dealt with by the UN on general principles and procedures applicable to seating representatives of Members when there are rival claimant governments. This question must be taken up by the next General Assembly. As an over-all policy problem, only the General Assembly should decide which of the competing claimant governments should be seated in the UN as representatives of Member states; this decision should be made by a simple majority. When the General Assembly is not in session, the Security Council should be authorized, pending final decision by the General Assembly, to decide between competing claimants by a vote of any seven members of the Security Council. When a government is seated by the UN as representing a Member state, such government would be bound to fulfill the legal, political and financial obligations of that Member to the United Nations.

Procedurally, it would be desirable to obtain UN consideration of the general issues prior to the General Assembly in order that the General Assembly in September might be able to come to a decision promptly. This could be done by having the Interim Committee make a study during the summer and report its recommendations two or three weeks before the opening of the Fifth Session of the General Assembly. The Interim Committee might report on (a) the general principles to be applied to the seating of representatives in organs and agencies of the UN when there are rival claimant governments, and (b) the procedures to be applied by the General Assembly in its consideration and decision of the question of seating the representatives of China.

Although it would be possible now for the United States to participate in a discussion of applicable general principles and procedures, it is not possible to say now how the facts in the China situation will fit such principles and procedures in September. Events in China itself, the conduct of the Peking regime toward its neighbors, and the attitude of the authorities on the mainland toward a pacific settlement of the Formosa problem are factors which may affect the answer reached by many UN Delegations.

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Under the pressure of the Soviet withdrawal and increasing recognition of the Peking regime, the present prospect is that a majority of the UN membership would vote to seat Chinese Communist representatives unless new factors enter the situation.

Since the free world expects to move to the counter-offensive and reduce Kremlin control over its present orbit, and since we wish to have flexibility in dealing with possible new situations in China, it would be advantageous to the free world to have the seating question decided by the UN with maximum ease and a minimum majority in order to establish procedures of maximum benefit to us in the future.

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